The Many_Faces_of_Saeed_Sheikh - Part 4 ~~~ Why would Pakistan's secret service openly back someone like Saeed? Pakistan's population is only a fraction of their arch-rival, India, and in a conventional war they likely would fare badly. Several wars have been fought between the two countries over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Because Pakistan's army cannot compete with India's in Kashmir, it has resorted to guerrilla attacks using radical Muslim terrorists to make up for their lack of numbers. The ISI directs the terrorist groups fighting in Kashmir, but tries to maintain a certain level of distance and plausible deniability. [New York Times, 10/29/01] It is usually maintained that the terror groups fighting in Kashmir have nothing to do with other terrorist groups fighting other enemies of Islam around the world. However, this distinction does not exist in reality. For instance, terrorist leader Maulana Masood Azhar was freed with al-Qaeda help in the same 1999 airplane hijacking swap that freed Saeed. Azhar quickly returned to Pakistan in January 2000, but didn't face arrest. Instead, a few days after being freed, he told a cheering Pakistani crowd of 10,000 supporters, "I have come here because this is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India." [AP, 1/5/00] He then toured Pakistan for weeks under the protection of the ISI. [Vanity Fair, 8/02] Saeed had grown close to Azhar in Indian prison. In early 2000, Saeed and the ISI helped Azhar form a new terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammad, and soon Azhar was behind more terrorist acts, mostly in Kashmir. [Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02, Guardian, 7/16/02, Washington Post, 2/8/03] Jaish-e-Mohammad worked with the ISI, Saeed and Ansari in their numerous attacks. For instance, shortly after the October 2001 Kashmir bombing, Indian intelligence claims that Pakistani President Musharraf was given a recording of a phone call between Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar and ISI Director Mahmood in which Azhar reported the bombing is a "success." [UPI, 10/10/01, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] In early January 2002, the FBI was interested in questioning Azhar, and a Pakistani official stated that, "The Americans are aware Azhar met bin Laden often, and are convinced he can give important information about bin Laden's present whereabouts and even the September 11 attacks." [Gulf News, 1/5/02] The ISI, mainly through these proxy terrorist groups, has deep ties to al-Qaeda. In 1993, the same Azhar helped al-Qaeda train and fund Somali warlord forces so they could kill US soldiers stationed in Somalia. These attacks forced the US to withdraw from that country. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02, Los Angeles Times, 2/25/02] For years, the ISI has had Kashmiri terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad train in the same Afghanistan training camps used by bin Laden. [New York Times, 10/29/01, Time, 5/6/02] In fact, in August 1998 when Clinton launched missiles to kill bin Laden in one of his training camps, the missiles accidentally killed five ISI officers and some twenty of their trainees. [Observer, 8/23/98, New Yorker, 1/24/00] Protecting bin Laden
Without a doubt, bin Laden's safe haven in Afghanistan would not have existed without the ISI. Two days before 9/11, the Taliban preemptively took out their main enemy is anticipation of a post-9/11 backlash. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/9/02] Two men posing as journalists assassinated Northern Alliance leader General Ahmed Shah Massoud, the one opposition leader with broad popular support in Afghanistan. [BBC, 9/10/01, BBC, 9/10/01] His assassins had ties to both al-Qaeda and the ISI. [Radio Free Europe, 9/10/01, Newsday, 9/15/01, Reuters, 10/4/01] The Taliban's army had been massing for an attack against the Northern Alliance for weeks, but didn't attack until hours after Massoud's assassination. A large portion of this force was actually made of Pakistani soldiers. [Time, 8/4/02] When the US attacked Afghanistan after 9/11, the ISI secretly supported the Taliban with military advisors and weapon shipments, despite promising the US not to. [Telegraph, 10/10/01, Knight Ridder, 11/3/01, New York Times, 12/8/01, UPI, 11/1/01, Time, 5/6/02] A anonymous Western diplomat later stated, "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs." [New York Times, 12/8/01] But why this would not be understood is a mystery. In June 2001, UPI reporters noted, "Despite Pakistan's official denials, Taliban is entirely dependent on Pakistani aid. This was verified on the ground by UPI. Everything from bottled water to oil, gasoline and aviation fuel, and from telephone equipment to military supplies, comes from Pakistan." [UPI, 6/14/01] A Curious Visit
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